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A
s scholars of women’s 
religious communities 
and female religiosity 
have often noted, over the 
course of the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries, church 
authorities sought to limit 
women’s religious options 
through increasingly strict 
legislation. Citing church 
decrees concerning nuns and 
beguines, such as Pope Boniface 
VIII’s Periculoso (1298) and the 
Clementine decrees Ad Nostrum 
and Cum de Quibusdam 
(1317), several studies have 
argued that the later Middle 
Ages was a period of growing 
hostility towards unregulated 
expressions of female religiosity. 
While scholars have regarded 
these decrees as important 
indicators of religious women’s 
troubled relationship with the 
institutional Church, Elizabeth 
Makowski’s new book is the 
first in-depth examination 
of canonical commentary on 
the Clementine decrees and 
other legislation targeting 
quasi-religious women. In this 
valuable contribution to the 
study of women’s extra-religious 
communities, Makowski 
contends that, though canonists 
tended to interpret legislation 
concerning secular canonesses 
and beguines harshly, this 
same group of men tended to 
recognize the legitimacy of 
quasi-religious communties 
in cases brought before the 
canon law courts. The author’s 
discussion of this gap between 
legal interpretations and practice 
offers a fresh perspective on 
attitudes toward quasi-religious 
women and the extent to 
which these attitudes limited 
opportunities for women to live 
as quasi-religious. 
One of the strengths of 
Makowski’s book is its 
thorough discussion of the 
difficulties medieval lawyers 
experienced clarifying the 
legal status of quasi-religious 
women. Definitions of what 
it meant to live a religious life 
were of central importance to 
canonists wishing to determine 
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the protections and privileges 
to which quasi-religious women 
were entitled. While some 
medieval thinkers advocated 
a broader definition of the 
“religious life,” one based more 
on personal comportment than 
on membership in a particular 
order, by the beginning of 
the fourteenth century canon 
law had defined the religious 
person, in the strict sense, as 
one who took vows of poverty, 
chastity, and obedience and 
had made profession in an 
approved order. For canon 
lawyers, categorization as 
“religious” or “secular” depended 
upon the fulfillment of these 
requirements. Thus, canonists 
defined canonesses, beguines, 
and tertiaries as “quasi-religious” 
since they did not meet all of 
the requirements established 
by canon law to be defined 
as “truly” religious in the 
legal sense. The ambiguous 
status of these groups vexed 
canonists. Because canonists 
found themselves deciding 
or commenting upon cases 
determining the privileges of 
quasi-religious groups, they 
were particularly concerned  
with the legal implications of 
their status.
Part One discusses decrees 
targeting canonesses, 
beguines, and tertiaries on 
which canonists composed 
commentary. Referring to the 
same decrees, canonical glosses, 
and supporting documents in 
their writings, canonists often 
likened secular canonesses 
to beguines. Without fail, 
canonists insisted that, though 
these women were the subject 
of legislation and regulation, 
such attention did not imply 
approval of their status. The 
issue for many canonists was 
not only the way canonesses and 
beguines blurred distinctions 
between “religious” and 
“secular” but also how their 
way of life seemed calculated 
to deceive observers. For these 
commentators, by wearing a 
distinctive habit and living 
in common, canonesses and 
beguines attempted to imitate 
the “true” religious life and 
consequently deceive observers 
into believing that they were 
religious in the strict canonical 
sense of the word. 
Despite the oft-cited “escape 
clause” in the Vienne decree 
Cum de Quibusdam, which 
vaguely exempted “faithful 
women living uprightly in 
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their own lodgings” from the 
condemnation the remainder 
of the decree implied, most 
canonists interpreted Cum de 
Quibusdam as an unequivocal 
condemnation of the beguine 
status. Indeed, Makowski 
demonstrates that canonists 
interpreted Cum de Quibusdam 
far more negatively and applied 
it more broadly than its authors 
originally intended. This point 
may come as no surprise to 
scholars familiar with accounts 
of the local persecutions 
of beguine communities 
after the publication of the 
Vienne decrees. Nevertheless, 
Makowski’s observation that 
canonists, many of whom 
had no first-hand knowledge 
of beguine communities in 
Northern Europe, tended to 
adopt such strongly unfavorable 
opinions towards both 
canonesses and beguines sheds 
additional light on official 
reactions to the Council of 
Vienne’s most famous decree. 
Despite their negative 
assessments of canonesses and 
beguines, canonists consistently 
supported tertiaries, who they 
were careful to differentiate 
from beguines. This insistence 
is significant in light of 
recent scholarship on German 
beguines and tertiaries, which 
demonstrates that local 
observers recognized almost no 
difference between the lifestyles 
and communal organization of 
beguines and tertiaries and often 
employed the terms “tertiary” 
and “beguine” interchangeably. 
In their commentaries on 
Cum de Quibusdam, however, 
canonists were careful to 
point out that tertiaries were 
not to be confused with 
beguines and were therefore 
not subject to the “blanket 
condemnation” they believed 
the decree expressed. While 
the author does not explore 
this disjunction between local 
and canonical understandings 
of these two groups, she 
demonstrates that the care with 
which canonists differentiated 
between beguines and tertiaries 
can be partially attributed to the 
fact that the tertiaries’ status, 
unlike that of canonesses and 
beguines, was papally approved. 
This distinction clarified and 
validated the tertiaries’ status 
in the eyes of the juridically-
minded commentators. 
Makowski is not only interested 
in how canonists interpreted 
legislation concerning quasi-
139
their own lodgings” from the 
condemnation the remainder 
of the decree implied, most 
canonists interpreted Cum de 
Quibusdam as an unequivocal 
condemnation of the beguine 
status. Indeed, Makowski 
demonstrates that canonists 
interpreted Cum de Quibusdam 
far more negatively and applied 
it more broadly than its authors 
originally intended. This point 
may come as no surprise to 
scholars familiar with accounts 
of the local persecutions 
of beguine communities 
after the publication of the 
Vienne decrees. Nevertheless, 
Makowski’s observation that 
canonists, many of whom 
had no first-hand knowledge 
of beguine communities in 
Northern Europe, tended to 
adopt such strongly unfavorable 
opinions towards both 
canonesses and beguines sheds 
additional light on official 
reactions to the Council of 
Vienne’s most famous decree. 
Despite their negative 
assessments of canonesses and 
beguines, canonists consistently 
supported tertiaries, who they 
were careful to differentiate 
from beguines. This insistence 
is significant in light of 
recent scholarship on German 
beguines and tertiaries, which 
demonstrates that local 
observers recognized almost no 
difference between the lifestyles 
and communal organization of 
beguines and tertiaries and often 
employed the terms “tertiary” 
and “beguine” interchangeably. 
In their commentaries on 
Cum de Quibusdam, however, 
canonists were careful to 
point out that tertiaries were 
not to be confused with 
beguines and were therefore 
not subject to the “blanket 
condemnation” they believed 
the decree expressed. While 
the author does not explore 
this disjunction between local 
and canonical understandings 
of these two groups, she 
demonstrates that the care with 
which canonists differentiated 
between beguines and tertiaries 
can be partially attributed to the 
fact that the tertiaries’ status, 
unlike that of canonesses and 
beguines, was papally approved. 
This distinction clarified and 
validated the tertiaries’ status 
in the eyes of the juridically-
minded commentators. 
Makowski is not only interested 
in how canonists interpreted 
legislation concerning quasi-
139
religious women, she also seeks 
to determine how canonists 
applied such legislation in the 
courts. Part Two, which draws 
on concilia (legal opinions) and 
decisiones of the Roman Rota, 
serves to contrast the legal 
theories presented in Part One 
with practice, as presented in 
court cases involving quasi-
religious communities. Here, 
Makowski demonstrates 
that, while canonists severely 
interpreted church legislation 
concerning canonesses and 
beguines, in several court 
cases, they defended and even 
extended greater ecclesiastical 
privileges to certain quasi-
religious communities. While 
the ambiguous status of 
quasi-women clearly troubled 
canonists, the author deftly 
shows that this ambiguity 
allowed for some flexibility 
when determining the rights 
to which such women were 
entitled. 
Makowski’s comparison of 
legal theory and its application 
effectively complicates the 
scholarly narrative on women’s 
religious communities by 
showing that fourteenth-
century legislation directed 
at quasi-religious women 
did not necessarily signify an 
unmitigated attack on women’s 
communities. Ultimately, 
however, it seems that medieval 
lawyers adopted a more flexible 
stance towards certain categories 
of semi-religious women and 
not others. Makowski notes in 
her conclusion that negative 
commentary regarding the 
beguine status adversely affected 
the women who chose this 
life. Beguines in many towns 
in Northern Europe opted 
to become tertiaries, a status 
that afforded women greater 
protection, as evidenced by 
the favorable light in which 
canonists regarded the Third 
Order of St. Francis. Thus, 
canonical literature seems to 
have impacted beguines more 
negatively than other groups 
of semi-religious women. 
Makowski provides only one 
example of how medieval legal 
commentaries on beguines were 
applied in practice, however. 
This particular case was decided 
in favor of an unidentified 
beguine community (more 
details on the case, if available, 
would have been welcome), 
revealing that not all canonists 
were hostile to the beguine 
status. Given Makowski’s 
strong argument for the ways 
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in which canonists’ opinions 
impacted the lives of semi-
religious women, both favorably 
and unfavorably, a few more 
examples demonstrating how 
these commentaries did or did 
not factor into jurists’ decisions 
would have shed more light 
on canonists’ views on this 
particularly vulnerable group of 
quasi-religious women. 
Nevertheless, Makowski’s book 
presents a new perspective 
on official understandings of 
quasi-religious women that 
suggests intriguing avenues 
for future research. Canonists’ 
comparisons of beguines and 
canonesses reiterate older 
theories about the origins 
of the beguine movement. 
Moreover, Makowski’s findings 
concerning the links between 
communities of tertiaries and 
beguines in Northern Europe, a 
connection only touched upon 
in a handful of studies, should 
inspire further investigation into 
these connections. Makowski 
briefly discusses these avenues 
in the final part of the book, 
which summarizes medieval 
lawyers’ views on quasi-religious 
women and the implications 
of these views for modern 
scholars. Overall, Makowski’s 
book will prove useful to 
scholars interested in canon 
law, religious women, and 
the relationship between legal 
theory and practice.
Tanya Stabler
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